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As China Rises, Upholding National Interests While Enabling A Better Future
~ “The South China Sea functions as the throat of the Western Pacific and Indian oceans— where global sea routes coalesce. More than half of the world’s annual merchant fleet tonnage passes through these, and a third of all maritime traffic worldwide. Oil transported is triple what passes through the Suez Canal and fifteen times what transits the Panama Canal.” ~ Robert Kaplan, 2014.
~ “Disputes over the political jurisdiction of the Nansha (Spratly) Islands escalated, as China, Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines and Taiwan established continuous human presence on different small islands and some major reefs. Their military outposts and other facilities demonstrated the seriousness of their sovereignty claims. Competitive occupation of key features has increased, occurring sporadically since the 1950s as countries took turns to stake out their territorial claims. So far, Vietnam has occupied 29 features in the islands, the Philippines eight
and Malaysia five. Brunei claims sovereignty to Louisa Reef and Rifleman Bank. China controls eight features, with Taiwan occupying Taiping Dao (Itu Aba), the largest feature in the Islands.” ~ Wu Shicun, 2013
~ “There are approximately half a million formations of islands in the world, and these formations are extremely diverse. A question thus arises whether all ‘islands’ should generate an ‘exclusive economic zone” (EEZ) as well as a continental shelf, regardless of their differences in size, habitability, economic factors, etc. If the answer were in the affirmative, a tiny marine formation could generate a 200-mile EEZ and a continental shelf. This interpretation would further promote the division of the oceans, and diminish the scope of the high seas and the Area, which is the common heritage of mankind. This view would also entail the risk of increasing territorial disputes where there are potential natural resources in the maritime area around these islands.” ~ Yoshifumi Tanaka, 2012
~ ““Unlike the United States, China has no option to withdraw from the Asia region. This fact alone cannot help but give pause to any smaller nation that might contemplate defying Beijing’s will.” ~ Aaron Friedberg, 2013.
~ “By home-porting its newest submarines in Hainan, alongside its extensive communications and intelligence-gathering infrastructure, China is exerting regional maritime control incrementally. using its land to control the sea.” ~ Bussert and Ellerman, 2011
~ “ ‘Historic rights’ may be defined as rights over certain land or maritime areas acquired by a State through a continuous and public usage from time immemorial and acquiescence by other States, although those rights would not normally accrue to it under general international law.” ~ Yoshifumi Tanaka, 2012
~ “The Parties undertake to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability including, among others, refraining from action of inhabiting on the presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays, and other features and to handle their differences in a constructive manner.” ~ the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea between China and ASEAN, 2002
In the past year or two there seemingly has been a sudden rise of fiery tensions between several South-East Asian nations – notably Philippines and Vietnam – and China over their competing claims to the Spratly (Nansha) Islands – a large group of over 230 islands and other rock formations (shoals, reefs, banks and cays) covering a vast area of over 800,000 square kilometers across the South China Sea (SCS). Meanwhile, Vietnam and China have engaged in aggressive skirmishing over competing oil rigs and fishing grounds around the Paracels (Xisha) Islands that lie between northern Vietnam and the southern Chinese island of Hainan.
Paradoxically, these conflicts have flared up as both nations have become ever more linked to China economically, through rapidly expanding trade and in terms of foreign direct investment (FDI). China is now by far their largest trading partner, and the single largest source of FDI in the region. Despite this – or perhaps because of it? – competition over the Spratlys and the Paracels have spilled over ominously into inter-communal violence (Vietnamese recently rioted and attacked Chinese workers in a northern Vietnamese city) and international skirmishes. Vietnamese and Chinese naval vessels have attacked each other’s commercial vessels; and Philippines’ and Chinese naval vessels have likewise. Quite worryingly, this has sparked a popular upsurge in extreme nationalism : anti-Chinese feelings – tending even to xenophobia – are running apparently higher in both Philippines and Vietnam, as are similar nationalistic sentiments in China itself. Demonstrations against China’s actions – most notably recently in Mabini Reef – have been organized in major U.S. cities in recent weeks.
To be sure, the SCS – as Robert Kaplan notes (see above quote) is one of the world’s crucially important and valuable sea lanes, strategically as well as economically. It literally dominates world shipping in value of cargo, notably oil but also its high share of China’s total foreign trade. But what are the roots of these conflicts and why have they come to the fore now? How will smaller S.E. Asian nations manage their relations with their huge neighbor to benefit from China’s rapid economic rise?
Key Questions : Are these rising conflicts new, and where did they emerge from? How have China and other smaller SCS nations handled their contradictory relations over the disputed island chains? What role does the much cited United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) play in this? Given the importance of their trading, economic, political and cultural ties, how can especially the smaller S.E. Asian nations best advance their own interests in the SCS while benefitting from China’s rise? What role should the United States play in future?
Roots of Conflict and Recent Actions : While seemingly recent, competition and tensions over the SCS island chains go deep back into the past. China and Vietnam each claim historically to have had political control over the Spratlys and the Paracels going back to the 18th century (Vietnam) and to the 11th century B.C.E. (China). The 1950 Japan-Taiwan treaty officially ending World War II ceded the Spratlys back to Taiwan – something Chinese premier Zhou Enlai seized upon to lay the People’s Republic of China (PRC)’s claim to them. This was initially questioned by the then colonial Western powers – France and the U.S.A. Later, after Vietnamese independence from France in 1954, the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam initially supported the PRC’s claim, before – much to China’s lasting chagrin – withdrawing its backing in the 1960s to put forward its own claim.
Following the 1956 private fishing company owner Cloma’s expedition, that raised the Filipino flag on many of what it christened the “Kalayaan” (Freedom) islands, the Philippine government actively pursued its claim to extend its territory, out of economic interest in oil and gas and fishing in the rich waters. Meanwhile, Malaysia (from its eastern provinces of Sabah and Sarawak), Brunei and Taiwan all have put forward their own claims since.
With this staking out of claims, the stage was set for the prolonged recurring periodic surges of claim and counter-claim by China and by each of the other SCS littoral nations. As Chinese maritime law expert Shicun Wu notes (above quote), in time each nation had gradually expanded its foothold on a growing number of islands, reefs and banks. So, by now fifty different formations are occupied by military of civilian economic installations. Vietnam has by far the most at twenty-nine. Followed by China (eight), then the Philippines and Malaysia (five each).
Alongside this, all the SCS countries have significantly expanded their economic exploitation of the sea for fishing and especially off-shore under seabed oil and gas deposits. Both the Philippines and Vietnam are moving to rapidly expand off-shore oil and gas production in the SCS. Meanwhile, major Chinese oil companies – such as CNOOC – are moving in leasing exploration blocks in hotly disputed SCS areas – notably within Vietnam’s 200 mile extended economic zone (EEZ) – giving rise to heightened tensions.
UNCLOS : Ambiguous, Contested Reality? In 1994, the implementation framework for UNCLOS III (adopted in 1982) was finally approved and made effective. It aims to create a consistent and legally equalitarian basis for sharing the resources of the world’s seas and oceans among all nations. In addition to 12 mile territorial waters, coastal nations are permitted a non-sovereign 200 mile extended economic zones (EEZ) in which they have exclusive right to explore and exploit, but also soundly manage, the sea’s resources – above and below seabed. While admirable in principle, in practice, UNCLOS has proven quite ambiguous and complicated to administer. Overlaps between neighboring nations’ EEZ (notably China and Vietnam) repeatedly give rise to conflict.
Because maritime rights are measured from baselines on land formations – including islands and even reefs that can be very small – considerable ambiguity is left open for nation’s arbitrarily to try to extend their EEZ, as Japan did in the Okinotorishima islets. As law of the sea expert Yoshifumi Tanaka notes (above quote), if every small island formation were to claim a 200 mile EEZ it would massively increase territorial disputes. Under UNCLOS, the Philippines has claimed “achipelagic status” as a basis for its claim to the Spratly islands – now before ITLOS. However, the baselines do not even link with any main islands of the Philippines archipelago! Meanwhile, China and Vietnam both lay claim to the Spratly (Nansha) Islands based upon “historic rights” – accruing from continuing and public usage dating back long in time. This basis is also – though not always ! – upheld in UNCLOS disputes. It underlies China’s claim to most of the SCS!
The Asean-China DOC: To help better manage the rising tide of claims and disputes in the SCS, Asean and China agreed a Declaration of Conduct of Parties in the SCS (DOC) in 2002. it aims to suspend further island inhabitation and to settle disputes in a constructive manner. Quite a lot has been achieved under the DOC in terms of multi-lateral initiatives to map islands and study maritime environment protection issues – especially fishing. It essentially follows the Chinese penchant for starting with confidence building in less contentious areas and avoiding full international arbitration in favor of bi-lateral and multi-lateral negotiations.
But the DOC has in effect done little to stem the rising tide of periodic tensions and disputes between SCS nations – most particularly between China and Vietnam, and China and the Philippines. Periodic rounds of more amicable high-level negotiations (notably between China and Vietnam) have thus alternated with ever more strident and violent conflicts and disputes.
Because smaller SCS nations – such as Philippines and Vietnam are wary of building over-dependent status vis-a-vis their gargantuan neighbor, China, the continuing uncertainty brought about by UNCLOS ambiguity and DOC ineffectiveness may in some way appear to serve their need for greater independence of action, at least in the short and medium terms. However, this comes at the cost of increasingly strident rounds of dispute and conflict that might one day suddenly veer out of control.
In this context, as military strategy experts Bussert and Ellerman note (above quote), China is progressively expanding its military – and especially naval and intelligence – capabilities across the SCS. Other SCS nations are doing likewise – submarine orders have spiked in the past few years! Meanwhile, the United States – as part of Pres. Obama’s “pivot to Asia” – has expressed strong support for maintaining the “freedom of the seas” and sea lanes, and agreed to station some military capabilities to reassure smaller allies. But the USA has also made clear it does not take sides in SCS maritime disputes. This even though China believes the Philippines, for instance, is seeking US support for its Spratly claim, and is troubled by it.
The SCS and Ties to China’s Economy : Periodic heightened conflict with China over the SCS islands is like a quite risky “game of chicken” for the far smaller SCS nations – especially Vietnam and the Philippines. Both nations are benefitting greatly from China’s rapid growth in terms of expanding export markets : the Philippines in terms of exports (over one third now go to China) but less so in terms of FDI; Vietnam more in terms of FDI and indirect exports, despite its trade deficit with China.
Conclusions : As Princeton political strategy professor Aaron Friedberg notes (above quote), for China the SCS is its backyard – that it must defend as a secure zone alongside its highly populated and economically strong coastal provinces. Even in event of conflict, the smaller SCS nations will ultimately need to find a hopefully win-win ‘modus vivendi’ with their huge neighbor. While uncertainty may play to their advantage near term, it will be important to find effective means of settling SCS island disputes on a mutually beneficial basis. To do so, less developed economies such as Vietnam and the Philippines, might seek to emulate South Korea. As Chinese president Xi Jin Ping’s recent visit there showed, having a technologically advanced and highly capable export economy appear to gain China’s respect and desire (need) to do business on a different footing. I for one, hope that better mechanisms of dispute resolution are found as a matter of high priority.